

Argentina Lithium Procurement & Supplier Analysis

Case Analysis – Rincón & Sal de Oro Research | Argentina |
2026–2029 Procurement Window

Marcus A. Volz | Market Analyst | Econosur

Purpose of this analysis

This case analysis applies an auditable research workflow to reconstruct lithium procurement and supplier intelligence. Its value lies in the traceable chain from source → evidence → project and package attribution → supplier or contractor relationship → commercial implication. Claims are separated into Verified, Strongly Indicated and Unresolved so the reader can see what the public record supports and where additional primary-source or field validation would add value.

How to evaluate it

A reader should be able to trace a conclusion back to source evidence, distinguish project presence from technical scope and contract route, and identify the exact point where public evidence ends. The final prose is the visible output; reproducing the evidentiary result requires recreating the underlying research and verification path.

Executive Summary

Argentina's lithium investment cycle is generating large and technically diverse procurement requirements, but the addressable opportunity cannot be understood from project capex or corporate supplier portals alone. The critical analytical task is to reconstruct who controls supplier access, who integrates engineering and construction, which contractors execute individual packages, and where the final buying point sits for a specific product or service. The two projects examined here show that owner control can coexist with materially different execution structures. At Rincón, Rio Tinto retains the supplier gateway while Worley acts as Lead Integration Delivery Partner and coordinates subcontractors, technology providers and construction contractors. At Sal de Oro II, POSCO Argentina operates a more explicit transactional e-Procurement system, Worley is verified for Stage 2 Detailed Engineering, and POSCO E&C is strongly evidenced in the execution and integration layer. Major civil and infrastructure packages are then delivered by regional Argentine contractors and consortia. The cross-project result is commercially important. The operator-level architecture changes, but parts of the regional execution ecosystem persist across projects. Suppliers therefore need two maps at the same time: the owner-side qualification route and the package-level network of engineering firms, group companies, regional integrators and contractors. A supplier registered with the owner may still be far from the actual RFQ or technical decision-maker.

Rincón also demonstrates how public evidence can reach deeper than standard project summaries. Package codes, contractor documents, supplier portfolios, professional profiles, environmental filings, procurement pages and logistics records make it possible to reconstruct parts of the execution chain down to named firms and technical scopes.


Examples include Worley as LIDP, Clean TeQ Water on an owner-direct process package, JordProxa on process technology, Montgomery & Associates on hydrogeology, Modular Solutions–Saltapor on Camp 1500, Ruhrpumpen on a fire-pump package, Milicic–AGV and Conevial on civil works, and a strongly indicated electrical contractor for the 33 kV line and substation package.

Sal de Oro II confirms that the method transfers to a different corporate model. POSCO's e-Pro process covers supplier qualification, RFQ publication, competitive bidding, purchase-order review and electronic contract execution. Worley is explicitly identified as the Stage 2 Detailed Engineering contractor, while a ZLATO–BBC–INVLAC–HUASI consortium is directly linked to a large evaporation-pond and earthworks package. Huasi appears on additional site-preparation and camp scopes, M8 Ingeniería is explicitly tied to a 13.2 kV medium-voltage network and substations, and POSCO E&C appears repeatedly in Stage 2 construction and engineering traces.

Seven findings emerge from the comparison: corporate delivery structure shapes the integration architecture; owner control remains the first supplier gate; a regional execution ecosystem spans operators; corporate procurement portals identify only the first buying point; prior project delivery is a meaningful commercial signal; General Güemes is emerging as a shared industrial and logistics node; and public evidence becomes weakest at the final package-contracting layer, especially in medium-voltage and electrical work.

Two owner-controlled procurement architectures

Same owner control at the gate — different integration layer, driven by the operator's corporate structure.



Why the difference is predictive:

Rio Tinto (pure-play miner, no captive EPC) outsources integration to Worley.
 POSCO (vertically integrated conglomerate) keeps integration in-house via its captive EPC arm POSCO E&C.
 The shared layer is regional — IMEC serves both operators.

Figure 1. Procurement architecture comparison. Owner control remains the first gate in both projects, while the integration and execution layers diverge.

1. Business Question, Research Design and Evidence Discipline

Business question

Which Argentine lithium projects create concrete procurement opportunities in the 2026–2029 window, who controls that procurement, and what can observed project and supplier behavior tell a prospective equipment or service provider about commercial access?

Auditable research method

The analysis combines owner disclosures, engineering and contractor documents, government and environmental records, supplier portfolios, procurement portals, professional profiles, logistics evidence and company-side project references. Evidence is separated into four working layers: Sources (S), Evidence records (E), Execution and Supplier records (X), and Corporate Patterns (P). This separation prevents a company mention, a technical project scope and a legal contract award from being treated as equivalent evidence.

The verification discipline is deliberately conservative. A contractor is treated as Verified when a project-specific source explicitly connects the company to the project and scope. Strongly Indicated is used when multiple independent signals align on project, timing and technical scope but the formal award or legal contracting route remains absent. Unresolved is used when the available evidence is insufficient to identify the responsible entity or transaction route. Confidence is assigned separately from status because a project relationship can be highly certain while the exact commercial structure remains uncertain. The method also treats the public-evidence boundary as an analytical output. When technical scope, permitting and construction status are visible but the final purchase order or subcontract issuer is not, the appropriate result is not to force a conclusion. The commercially useful result is to identify the missing layer and the type of evidence needed to resolve it: an award notice, package document, PO, submittal, QA/HSE record, contractor portfolio or verified professional record.

2. Rincón / Rio Tinto – Deep Dive

Project position

Rincón has moved from development into execution. The 3 ktpa starter plant is in ramp-up, while the Full Potential expansion represents a multi-billion-dollar construction program. The formal production basis is 53 ktpa of lithium carbonate, with a designed capacity of approximately 60 ktpa after debottlenecking and first expansion production targeted for 2028. This matters commercially because procurement is shifting from study and

project-development demand toward construction packages and, increasingly, future operating supply.

The project also creates unusually large recurring reagent and logistics requirements. The updated 53 ktpa logistics estimate in Table 8 specifies 100,912 tonnes per year of sodium carbonate. An earlier 50 ktpa RFP basis retained in Table 11 used 95.2 ktpa. On the updated basis, the project uses approximately 1.90 tonnes of sodium carbonate per tonne of lithium carbonate; this project-specific logistics ratio is distinct from the theoretical stoichiometric minimum. The commercial implication is that reagent sourcing, inland transport, container handling and export logistics can become recurring operating contracts rather than one-off construction purchases.

Procurement and delivery architecture

Rio Tinto retains direct control of the owner-side supplier interface at Rincón. Its South America procurement page includes Rincón, provides supplier registration and expression-of-interest access, and identifies a dedicated project supplier contact. This makes owner qualification a necessary entry condition for a supplier. It does not, however, identify the final package buyer.

Below the owner gateway, Worley plays the central integration role. Rio Tinto awarded Worley the Lead Integration Delivery Partner mandate for detailed design and execution, with explicit responsibility for coordinating subcontractors, technology providers and construction contractors. This is stronger than a conventional engineering reference because it defines Worley as an integration layer in the execution architecture.

The resulting structure is hybrid rather than purely owner-direct or purely EPCM-driven. Strategic technology packages can be awarded directly by Rincón Mining or Rio Tinto, while construction and balance-of-plant scopes can move through Worley coordination and package-level contractors. Clean TeQ Water is a clear example of an owner-direct specialist process award. JordProxa and Eurodia are owner-selected technology suppliers. At the same time, project records expose separate coded packages for camp infrastructure, precast concrete, pumps, civil works and other scopes.

Supplier and contractor map

The Verified / High-confidence core includes Worley as LIDP and execution integrator; Clean TeQ Water on the softening plant; JordProxa on the integrated process plant; Montgomery & Associates on hydrogeology, pumping-test analysis and resource/wellfield modelling; Modular Solutions–Saltapor UTE on CA6001 Camp 1500; Ruhrpumpen on the PM6040 fire-pump package; Milicic–AGV on civil and waste-related works; and Conevial on Rincón earthworks and land leveling/compaction.

A second tier remains commercially important despite incomplete award documentation. IMEC is strongly evidenced on sulfuric-acid tank, piping, instrumentation and pumping work. Bertotto Boglione is linked to fabrication of a 98% sulfuric-acid API 650 tank. Hidrotec is strongly indicated in wellfield drilling. Consorcio de Cooperación Andino is the strongest identified attribution for the Full Potential 33 kV line and associated substation electrical works, based on a Rio Tinto Salta electrical-mining recruitment trace, registered utility-network activity, timing and technical alignment. The formal Rincón award route remains unresolved, so the attribution stays below Verified.

What the package architecture reveals

Rincón demonstrates that project execution can be reconstructed one package at a time. Public project documents expose package families such as PC6001, CA6001 and PM6040. Once a package code is known, contractor records, payment references, supplier drawings and professional profiles can sometimes connect that code to a named supplier. This is commercially more useful than a generic list of companies because the package code identifies the actual workstream, technical duty and likely procurement route.

The project also shows supplier continuity. Worley appears across starter-plant, engineering and full-scale execution phases. JordProxa moved from modular process equipment and commissioning at Rincón 3K into a broader integrated process role for Full Potential. IMEC appears repeatedly in regional fabrication and installation work. This does not guarantee repeat awards, but it makes incumbency a meaningful probability signal when screening future packages.

Operating supply and logistics

Rincón's future operating supply chain extends well beyond construction. The project design links soda ash import, inland transport, container management and lithium carbonate export. The September 2024 feasibility study described a 50/50 Atlantic/Pacific corridor strategy for both lithium-carbonate exports and sodium-carbonate imports. Within the Argentine soda-ash corridor, the feasibility strategy allocates approximately 56% to truck-only transport and 44% to a road-rail combination. These figures are planning assumptions and may vary by year; they are not executed transport contracts.

Rio Tinto retains an owner-side foreign-trade coordination function, while external customs and logistics specialists execute beneath that interface. CIS Global Services is the strongest identified external candidate based on its relationship lineage to Rincón/Rio Tinto and its customs-broker, import-release, export-dispatch and multimodal logistics capabilities. The exact provider allocation for individual shipments remains unresolved. That distinction matters: control of foreign trade and physical execution do not have to sit with the same company.

Rincón commercial implications

For an equipment or service provider, the actionable route has two dimensions. First, qualify with Rio Tinto and understand the owner's purchase categories and supplier requirements. Second, identify the package-level buyer or technical gatekeeper: Worley, an owner-direct process team, a regional contractor or another specialist integrator. The same company can be well positioned with the owner and still miss an opportunity if it does not identify the package manager issuing or influencing the RFQ.

The strongest opportunity fields visible from the public record include process equipment and water treatment, pumping and fluid handling, electrical and medium-voltage infrastructure, wellfield services, steel fabrication and piping, civil and camp infrastructure, reagents, maintenance, customs services and multimodal logistics. The commercial priority should be based on package timing and buying point rather than on total project capex alone.

3. Sal de Oro II / POSCO – Transfer Case

Why Sal de Oro is a useful contrast

Sal de Oro provides a useful transfer test because the asset, corporate structure and procurement interface differ from Rincón. POSCO's Phase 1 system includes a 25 ktpa lithium-hydroxide plant in General Güemes, while Sal de Oro II / Phase 2 adds approximately 23 ktpa of lithium carbonate capacity. The Phase 2 project is structured as a separate RIGI vehicle and remains an active construction and execution case.

Owner-controlled e-Procurement

POSCO Argentina exposes an unusually explicit transactional procurement process. New suppliers are evaluated on credit, facilities and experience and may be subject to site inspection. Qualified suppliers gain access to bidding; RFQs are published in e-Pro; competitive bidding or negotiation follows; the selected supplier reviews the purchase order and signs the contract electronically. The owner therefore controls much more than an informational supplier-registration page.

Provincial evidence reinforces this owner-side role. POSCO Argentina presented Stage 2 directly to mining supplier associations and registered local suppliers so that companies could understand expansion plans and prepare for future purchasing and contracting calls. This demonstrates that local supplier outreach and the commercial gateway are actively managed by POSCO Argentina.

Engineering and execution structure

Worley is a verified Sal de Oro Stage 2 Detailed Engineering contractor. A project-originated engineering document identifies POSCO Argentina as client and Worley Limitada as contractor for Stage 2 Detailed Engineering, including electrical/high-altitude engineering context. The public evidence does not assign Worley the broad Rincón-style LIDP mandate. POSCO E&C is separately and repeatedly visible in the Stage 2 execution and engineering layer. Public project traces place POSCO E&C engineers on Stage 2 and show treatment-plant and building packages executed in collaboration with or for POSCO E&C. This supports a group-company integration layer, while the complete legal hierarchy among POSCO Argentina, POSCO E&C and Worley remains only partly public.

Named Phase 2 packages

The strongest civil example is the CP2 evaporation-pond and earthworks package. BBC identifies POSCO Argentina as client and ZLATO–BBC–INVLAC–HUASI UTE as the execution consortium for eight evaporation-process strings covering roughly 600 hectares, with approximately 9.6 million cubic metres of planned excavation and transport. Huasi independently lists Phase 2 evaporation ponds, temporary-camp earthworks and site-preparation work in its own project portfolio.

Electrical infrastructure is also traceable. M8 Ingeniería publicly identifies a Sal de Oro II 13.2 kV aerial medium-voltage line and aerial substations running from electrical room

6700-ER-001 to extraction-well substations and drying ponds, with an approximate total length of 35 km. The project and technical scope are explicit; the exact PO issuer and full legal execution responsibility are not.

The package map therefore includes Worley for Detailed Engineering; the ZLATO–BBC–INVLAC–HUASI consortium for major pond and earthworks execution; Huasi for additional camp and site-preparation packages; M8 for a defined MV network scope; POSCO E&C as a strongly evidenced execution/integration layer; Andariega on project buildings; and BBC on a separate treatment-plant civil/building workstream.

Sal de Oro commercial implications

The practical supplier route starts with POSCO Argentina qualification and e-Pro access, then moves to package-level mapping. A supplier needs to know whether the relevant technical and commercial decision sits directly with POSCO Argentina, with POSCO E&C, with an engineering partner such as Worley or with a regional contractor. The existence of an explicit e-Procurement platform simplifies the first step but does not remove the need to identify the execution-layer buyer.

Regional consortium participation is material. For foreign OEMs, this creates partnership and channel opportunities with Argentine contractors that already understand altitude, logistics, site access, provincial supplier requirements and project interfaces. The evidence also shows that the same regional firms can appear on multiple scopes, strengthening the case for contractor-network mapping as a commercial tool.

4. Cross-Project Analyst Findings

Finding 1 – Corporate delivery model shapes procurement architecture

Observation. Both projects preserve owner control but use different integration structures. Rincón combines Rio Tinto's owner organisation with Worley as formally appointed LIDP. Sal de Oro combines POSCO Argentina's owner procurement with Worley Detailed Engineering and a strongly evidenced POSCO E&C execution/integration layer.

Evidence and confidence. E117, E123, E124, E127 and E128 support the observed architecture contrast at High confidence. The interpretation that group structure drives the difference is Moderate confidence because two cases do not establish a universal causal rule.

Commercial implication. A supplier should identify the operator's actual delivery model before assuming that an EPCM or engineering consultant controls package access.

Corporate structure can materially change who integrates packages and who influences technical qualification and commercial decisions.

Finding 2 – Owner control survives different execution models

Observation. Rio Tinto and POSCO both retain the first commercial gate. Rincón uses owner registration, prequalification and EOI progression. POSCO Argentina's e-Pro extends from qualification through RFQ, bidding, PO review and electronic contract signature.

Evidence and confidence. E117, E123, S131, S138 and S139 support this at High confidence.

Commercial implication. Owner qualification is a durable first gate across both projects. Suppliers should treat owner onboarding as necessary infrastructure for market access, then map the downstream package route.

Finding 3 – A regional execution ecosystem spans operators

Observation. Parts of the NOA contractor and supplier ecosystem persist even when ownership and integration models change. IMEC publicly links itself to Rincón Mining, Worley and POSCO Argentina. Both projects also rely heavily on Argentine and NOA execution firms and consortia.

Evidence and confidence. S68, E124, P015, E125, E127 and E128 support High confidence for documented overlap and Moderate-High confidence for the broader regional-bank interpretation.

Commercial implication. Regional integrators with cross-operator relationships can be persistent access points for foreign OEMs and specialist suppliers. Mapping these firms may produce more durable commercial intelligence than mapping one project's corporate portal in isolation.

Finding 4 – The corporate procurement portal is only the first buying point

Observation. In both projects, corporate qualification does not reveal the complete transaction chain. Rincón packages can sit under owner-direct awards, Worley integration or specialist contractor chains. Sal de Oro packages can be bought directly by POSCO Argentina or appear under or with POSCO E&C and regional contractors.

Evidence and confidence. E117, E123, E125, E127, P009 and P013 support this at High confidence.

Commercial implication. Vendor registration should be paired with package mapping. The commercially useful question is who issues, manages or technically controls the relevant RFQ, purchase order or package after qualification.

Finding 5 – Prior project delivery is a commercial advantage

Observation. Rincón shows continuity through Worley, JordProxa and IMEC across phases. Sal de Oro shows repeat package participation by Huasi and BBC, with BBC appearing in both the CP2 pond consortium and a separate POSCO E&C treatment-plant workstream.

Evidence and confidence. P002, P010, P015, S141, S142, S146, E125 and E127 support High confidence for repeat participation and Moderate confidence for predictive strength.

Commercial implication. Incumbency is a useful probability signal. Suppliers that understand who has already delivered successfully can target follow-on packages, maintenance, modifications and operating supply with better odds than a purely greenfield lead list.

Finding 6 – General Güemes is emerging as a shared NOA industrial and logistics node

Observation. POSCO's downstream lithium-hydroxide plant is located in General Güemes. Rincón's logistics design and regional reagent movements identify the Güemes rail and logistics ecosystem as a relevant Argentine corridor option, while the final Rincón route allocation remains unresolved.

Evidence and confidence. S132, S91, S93, S114, E088, E104 and P019 support High confidence for POSCO's physical node and Moderate-High confidence for Rincón cross-project logistics relevance.

Commercial implication. Güemes can be treated as a cross-project commercial cluster for processing, road/rail transfer, reagent handling and mining logistics, while project-specific routing evidence remains separate.

Finding 7 – Public evidence weakens at the final package-contracting layer

Observation. The strongest repeated example is medium-voltage and electrical work. Rincón's 33 kV line/substation scope and construction status are verified, while the exact contractor award route remains unresolved. Sal de Oro II has an explicit M8 13.2 kV / approximately 35 km MV-line and substation scope, while the exact PO issuer and full execution responsibility remain unpublished.

Evidence and confidence. E109, E110, E117, E126 and S143 support High confidence for this repeated two-case evidence boundary. Confidence is Low-Moderate for any sector-wide generalisation beyond the two projects.

Commercial implication. Technical scope, permits and construction status should be separated from legal award attribution. Direct package documents, PO/submittal trails or contractor-side evidence are required for the final step.




Figure 2. Evidence-discipline matrix. Project presence and technical scope can be verified even where the final legal contract route remains unresolved.

5. Commercial Risk Signal

A current Sal de Oro infrastructure-contractor dispute illustrates a separate commercial-interface risk. Public reporting identifies a precautionary court measure of roughly USD 350,000–358,000 in a dispute linked to infrastructure including a pumping station and aqueduct pipeline. POSCO confirms the commercial controversy and the approximate precautionary amount while stressing that there is no final judicial decision on the merits.

The analytical value of the case is limited but real. It demonstrates that technical qualification is only one part of contractor risk. Contract administration, guarantees, scope acceptance, certification, payment mechanics and dispute resolution can materially affect execution. The dispute is treated here as a case-specific signal, not as evidence that regional contractors or POSCO contracts are systematically high-risk. Evidence: S147, S148 and E129.

6. Evidence Gaps and Paid-Research Questions

The public-source work is sufficient to reconstruct the core procurement architectures, identify multiple package-level actors and derive commercially useful patterns. Several high-value questions remain unresolved and represent natural boundaries between a public case analysis and a paid client mandate.

Rincón. The principal gaps are the legal award route for the 33 kV package; the owner-direct versus Worley-managed split for several packages; the brine-well vertical-turbine-pump OEM; acid-service valves and piping OEMs; the recurring soda-ash supplier and consignee structure; and the exact customs, forwarding, terminal and inland-logistics operator mix. Sal de Oro II. The main gap is the complete POSCO Argentina–POSCO E&C–Worley hierarchy by package. The public record identifies strong execution relationships but does not provide one master structure assigning every purchase order, package-management role and subcontract route. The M8 electrical package is a good example: project and technical scope are explicit, while the exact commercial issuer remains private. These gaps are commercially meaningful because they identify the point where direct verification becomes valuable. A client mandate could add supplier interviews, contractor outreach, local industry-association checks, procurement-team validation, customs records, package documents and site-level sources. The output would move from market mapping toward account-specific opportunity intelligence.

7. Implications for Suppliers and Market-Intelligence Users

The analysis suggests a practical four-step approach for suppliers targeting Argentina's lithium build-out. First, qualify with the owner and understand the approved-vendor process. Second, identify the project's delivery architecture and the entities that integrate engineering and construction. Third, map the specific package and its likely buyer, technical gatekeeper and local execution partners. Fourth, use supplier continuity, contractor overlap and regional infrastructure nodes to prioritize leads rather than treating every project announcement as an equal opportunity.

For an international OEM, the regional contractor layer is especially important. Local and NOA firms can provide project access, fabrication, installation, civil execution, site knowledge and provincial supplier compliance. The most attractive channel partner is often not simply the largest local contractor, but the firm that appears across multiple operators and technical workstreams.

For market-intelligence teams, the core lesson is methodological. Public information can support detailed procurement intelligence when source types are combined and evidence levels remain disciplined. Corporate procurement pages define access. Engineering and package documents reveal technical structure. Contractor portfolios and project records reveal execution. Professional profiles and supplier relationships can reveal second-tier networks. Government, environmental and logistics records define project boundaries and infrastructure. The value comes from combining these sources without converting correlation into a contract award.

8. Methodological Notes and Selected Sources

Evidence legend

Verified / High confidence: explicit project-specific primary or contractor evidence supports the relationship and scope. Strongly Indicated: multiple independent project, timing and

technical signals align, but the formal award or exact legal route is missing. Unresolved: available evidence does not support a responsible-entity or transaction-route attribution. A confidence level refers to the strength of the specific claim and may differ from the status of the broader company relationship.

Selected Rincón sources

S63 – Rincón / Worley supplier drawing: PM6040 – RINCON RUHRPUMPEN fire-pump package drawing, dated 6 August 2025 (accessed August 2026).

<https://www.scribd.com/document/981269254/153300061-024-Fire-Pump-Package-drawing-Diesel-Tank-1>

S65 – Ruhrpumpen Argentina: manufacturing facility and mining/pump capability profile (accessed August 2026). <https://ruhrpumpen.com/facilities/argentina/>

S66 – Ruhrpumpen: VTP Vertical Turbine Pump product documentation (accessed August 2026). <https://ruhrpumpen.com/product/vtp-vertical-turbine-pump/>

S119 – Rio Tinto, Q3 operations review: Rincón 33 kV construction status (accessed August 2026).

<https://www.riotinto.com/-/media/content/documents/invest/financial-news-and-performance/production/2025/2025-third-qor.pdf>

S121 – Rincón Litio 33 kV Power Supply ESIA: ET La Puna to project substation scope (accessed August 2026).

https://ewsdata.rightsindevelopment.org/files/documents/12/IFC-49112_O4PBIFq.pdf

S123 – Conevial official project portfolio: Rio Tinto / Salar del Rincón, leveling and compaction of 12 hectares (accessed August 2026).

<https://conevial.com.ar/obras-realizadas/>

S131 – Rio Tinto South America local procurement: Rincón supplier registration, EOI and dedicated supplier contact (accessed August 2026).

<https://www.riotinto.com/about/suppliers/local-suppliers/compras-locales-en-america-del-sur>

Selected Sal de Oro sources

S138 – POSCO Argentina procurement policies and e-Pro process (accessed August 2026). <https://www.poscoargentina.com/etica.php>

S139 – Government of Salta: POSCO Argentina presentation of Stage 2 to local mining suppliers (accessed August 2026).

<https://www.salta.gob.ar/prensa/noticias/posco-argentina-presento-la-etapa-2-de-su-proyecto-o-sal-de-oro-87996>

S140 – Sal de Oro Project Stage 2 Detailed Engineering project-document copy identifying POSCO Argentina as client and Worley Limitada as contractor (accessed August 2026).

<https://www.scribd.com/document/772235688/319020-00367-0000-EL-REP-10001-0-High-Altitude-Impact-Report-of-Electrical-Equipment>

S141 – Huasi Construcciones official portfolio: Phase 2 ponds, temporary-camp earthwork and site preparation (accessed August 2026). <https://huasi.com.ar/?lang=es>

S142 – BBC project post: POSCO / CP2 / ZLATO–BBC–INVLAC–HUASI UTE (accessed August 2026).

https://es.linkedin.com/posts/bbc-sa_bbc-posco-posco-activity-7224824070310137858-SO_L

S143 – M8 Ingeniería project reference: Sal de Oro II 13.2 kV MV line and substations (accessed August 2026).

<https://m8ingenieria.com.ar/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/0924-M8-Ingenieria-Obras-Alta-Tension.pdf>

S147 / S148 – Current reporting and POSCO-side statement on the Sal de Oro contractor dispute; used only as a bounded commercial-risk signal (accessed August 2026).

Provenance example: PM6040 / Ruhrpumpen

Package PM6040 first appears in S63, a project-specific supplier drawing dated 6 August 2025 that identifies the Worley Rincón project L0002/319080, contract number PM6040, mechanical unit 4414 and the title “RINCON – RUHRPUMPEN – Tank Drawing.” This directly connects Ruhrpumpen to a named Rincón fire-pump package, so project presence and technical scope are classified as Verified. S65, Ruhrpumpen Argentina’s facility profile, independently confirms local mining-market capability and vertical/horizontal pump manufacturing and service, while S66 confirms VTP capability for wells and water transfer; those capability sources support technical plausibility for adjacent pump scopes but do not establish additional Rincón awards. The contract-route status is therefore kept below Verified: the PM6040 drawing proves the package relationship, but it does not independently expose the exact PO or legal contract issuer between Rincón Mining, Worley and Ruhrpumpen. This separation is the intended audit trail: source evidence resolves presence and scope, while the commercial route remains explicitly bounded.

Discarded lead: 26076 / 431-T-02

The document-number trail 26076 / 431-T-02 was tested as a possible Rincón lead and rejected. Publicly indexed 26076/.../L0002 documents, including S90, belong to the Lawe-Lawe/Balikpapan refinery project and use Area 431 equipment and valve tags, so the numbering collision is not reliable evidence for Rincón. The reported tank-drawing lead therefore remains excluded until a project-specific Rincón source can reproduce it.

Analytical boundary

This case analysis is intentionally bounded. It shows how public information can be transformed into procurement and supplier intelligence while preserving the distinction between verified evidence, strong indication and unresolved contracting details. The remaining gaps define the next questions that justify direct field validation or a paid client mandate.

Research provenance

The differentiator is the documented evidence chain and the research decisions behind it. Conclusions can be traced across source, evidence-record, supplier-attribution and corporate-pattern levels, with unknowns left visible. The workflow combines live retrieval of poorly indexed project documents, source disambiguation, rejected leads and package cross-checking. Where public evidence ends, it can extend to primary-source, institutional or field validation.